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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Of THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAY TANNER AND EDGAR L. VANCE 
for themselves and as a class action on 
behalf of all persons similarly situated, 
Plaintiff - Appellants 
vs. 
!NTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS AS-
SOCIATION, aka UTAH POULTRY 
AND FARMERS COOPERATIVE, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant- Respondent 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10306 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Class and individual action to determine share of un-
divided interest owned by each person for whom assets 
are held in trust by Defendant, the rights and priorities 
of each to those assets, for judgment for amounts found 
to be due, for liquidation of Defendant Corporation, 
attorney fees, costs and other general relief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of order dismissing thei·r com. 
plaint, permitting them to amend if the complaint i 
defective in any manner and ordering Defendant to m: 
a responsive pleading thereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT COOPERATIVE 
CORPORATION 
Defendant is an agricultural cooperative association 
organized for the benefit of its patrons to assist them in 
purchasing and marketing agricultural products at cost 
on a cooperative basis. Defendant's articles of incorpor-
ation and by-laws expressly state that Defendant shall at 
no time own any property and that all assets held by 
Defendant are the property and are held in trust for the 
benefit of it's patrons. (R. 92) 
OWNERSHIP OF AND ALLOCATION OF MARGINS 
(PROFITS) 
The earnings (profits) realized by the Defendant re-
present savings to the patrons resulting from cooperative 
purchasing and marketing, are called "margins" and are 
the property of the patrons. A portion of these "margins" 
are allocated to the patrons by the issuance of "cert· 
ificates" which are to be redeemed by Defendant in cash 
at a future date. The balance of the "margins" realized 
by Defendant are retained by the Defendant as 
"reserves", however no "certificates" have been issued 
" es" by Defendant to evidence the share of those reserv 
owned by each of Defendant's patrons, notwithstanding 
Defendant's by-law No. 16 (R. 94) which requires the 
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Defendant to maintain records which reflect the interest 
of each patrons in such "reserves" and specifies that 
said "reserves" will be "revolved" (redeemed in cash and 
replaced by "reserves" created in later years). Defendant 
has failed to maintain records as to the ownership of 
each patron in said "reserves" and has failed to "revolve" 
said "reserves." 
ASSETS HELD IN TRUST BY DEFENDANT 
The great mass of assets held by Defendant in trust 
for it's patrons as aforesaid are co-mingled and have not 
been physically segregated or earmarked to assign speci-
fic assets to the "reserves" or "certificates" shown as 
liabilities on Defendant's books. In addition to working 
capital made available to Defendant from said "margins" 
and "reserves" the Defendant has obtained funds from 
the sale of stock to it's patrons, has borrowed money from 
it's patrons and from third parties. Additional value has 
been accumulated by increase in value of properties held 
in trust by Defendant for the benefit of it's patrons. 
PURPOSE OF THIS LAWSUIT 
The purpose of this lawsuit is to determine the owner-
ship of the resulting mass of assets held in trust by De-
fendant for the benefits of it's patrons and the rights 
and priorities of each of the owners. The acts and omis-
sions of Defendant which have complicated the deter-
mination of that ownership and which will affect that 
determination have been set forth in separate causes of 
action in Plaintiffs' complaint. 
The second cause of action (R. 92-93) asks for a 
determination of the ownership of the assets held in trust 
by Defendant. The first cause of action (R. 88-91) alleges 
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that the determination of that ownership will re uir 
11 t . f " t·f · " q e a re-a oca 10n o cer I icates issued to alloc t 
" · " t t d th h. a e margms o pa rons an e t ird cause of action 
(R. 93-94) alleges that it will be necessary to determine 
the owneship of the "reserves." 
The next three causes of action request a determination 
of the respective rights and priorities of the owners in 
and to those assets, and in particular the rights of patrons 
who have ceased to market produce through Defendant 
(4th cause of action - R. 94-95), the order in which 
"certificates" should be "redeemed" by Defendant (5th 
cause of action - R. 95) and whether Defendant should 
be restrained from making further distribution of assets 
or "redemption" of "certificates" until the ownership 
and priorities of the assets is determined (6th cause of 
action - R. 95-96). 
The seventh cause of action (R. 96) requests liquid· 
ation of the Defendant under general corporate law 
(16 - 10 - 92, UCA, 1953) and the eighth cause of action 
(R. 96-97) requests attorney fees. 
PROPERTY OWNED BY ONE CLASS OF PERSONS 
All of the causes of action deal with one single problem, 
to-wit: that of adjudication of the ownership of, rights 
concerning, priorities of the owners and claims concern-
ing specific property held in trust by Defendant for 
the benefit of it's patrons (Plaintiffs herein). 
Defendant argues that a separate class of persons with 
interests adverse to those of all other co-owners exists 
h' h for each year and for each of the sub-departments (w IC 
sub-departments were wrongfully created by Defendant 
in violation of it's articles of incorporation and by-laws), 
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that the named Plaintiffs are improper persons to re-
present these alleged classes of persons for years during 
which the named Plaintiffs were not patrons of De-
fendant, and that separate persons must represent each 
alleged class because the interests of each alleged class 
is adverse to the interests of each other class. 
Defendant's argument completely ignores the fact that 
we have a single mass of assets held in trust by the De-
tendant with a large number of persons each owning 
an unknown undivided interest in the mass of property. 
All persons owning an interest in that property are 
members of a single class. How each person acquired 
his interest is merely evidence from which his ownership, 
rights and priorities concerning that property will be 
ascertained. Because the evidence will differ with various 
of persons. This type of situation is precisely the situation 
1 contemplated by Rule 23 (a) (2), URCP, under which 
members of that class does not create different classes 
this action is brought (see pages 10-11 of this brief) 
HISTORY OF THIS ACTION 
The first complaint filed herein (R. 1-9) was a class 
action similar to the present case, except that it also 
included a stockholders derivative action on behalf of 
Defendant against the officers and directors of the De-
fendant. Defendant moved to dismiss that action because 
the Plaintiffs represented adverse interests in that they 
were both suing and suing on behalf of the Defendant 
and Judge Hanson quite properly dismissed that action 
with leave to amend. Defendant filed various motions 
in addition to the motion to dismiss. (R. 14-25) which in 
effect requested Plaintiffs to plead their evidence rather 
6 
than ultimate facts. The Court suggested in the m· t mu e 
entry (R. 112) that in amending our complaint we "follow 
the motion for a more definite statement" filed by De-
fendant (R. 14-19). The problems concerning identific-
ation of years, Defendants, acts and omissions, etc., com-
plained of, were cured by the amended complaint filed 
(R. 27-38) which complaint omitted all Defendants excep; 
the present Defendant. 
Defendant again filed the same series of motions 
(R. 42-69), most of which again asked that Plaintiffs 
plead their evidence. The argument of those motions 
before Judge Hanson was reported (R. 153-205) and 
primarily concerned allegations by Defendant concerning 
res judicata (R. 44; 46-60; 159-173) and the sufficiency 
ot the Plaintiffs' allegations concerning standing to sue. 
(R. 253-256). The Court Ruled against Defendant on the 
question of res judicata (R. 78) but again ordered the 
complaint dismissed with permission to amend pursuant 
to ground 1 of the motion to dismiss (R. 42, Par. 1) which 
alleges that Plaintiffs have failed to specify their interest 
or standing to sue. The Defendant's argument concerning 
this point was primarily to the effect that the introduc-
tory paragraph of the complaint wherein the standing 
of the named Plaintiffs and a description of the persons 
constituting the class were alleged did not constitute 
a part of any cause of action and therefore was in-
sufficient. (R. 178) 
COMPLAINT NOW BEFORE THE COURT 
Plaintiffs then filed the second amended complaint 
which is now under consideration (R. 87-99) which among 
other things includes the introductory paragraph as a 
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part of each cause of action and in addition alleges the 
ultimate facts that the named plaintiffs and the other 
members of the class who are "similarly situated" are 
the owners of or persons entitled to share in the "assets, 
net worth and or reserves" held in trust by Defendant; 
that the Plaintiffs are a class of persons entitled to 
maintain this action as a class action; that the members 
of the class are so numerous as to make it impractical 
lo bring them all before the Court; that the named 
Plaintiffs adequately represent the class; that the rights 
sought to be enforced are several and the object of the 
action is the adjudication of claims which affect specific 
property and that there are common guestions of fact 
and of law affecting the rights of the members of the 
class (R. 87-88). 
The Defendant again refiled the same motions (R. 
100-131) notwithstanding the Court's rulings concerning 
the similar prior motions (R. 78). Judge Jeppson heard 
the argument concerning these motions and not being 
familiar with the prior proceeding again entertained 
argument concerning all of said motions (R. 207-316) 
and ordered the Plaintiffs' complaint dismissed with 
prejudice (R. 137). The Court did not indicate the 
reason for it's order (R. 137), however Defendant caused 
an order to be signed by the Court (R. 138) stating the 
motion to dismiss was granted in "all particulars," and 
the Court declined to clearify that order (R. 143) al-
though Plaintiffs moved the Court to specify the grounds 
for the dismissal (R. 139). 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT DISMISSED 
The order dismissing Plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint puts squarely in issue the question of whether 
that complaint states a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. This question necessarily involves the essential 
elements of a pleading which are briefy discussed as 
follows: 
(a) Pleading ultimate facts. Rule 8 (a), URCP re-
quires only that a complaint give to the opposing party 
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim 
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. 
Blackham V. Snelgrove, 3 U. (2d) 157, 280 P. 2d 453, 455. 
It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the conduct, lang-
uage, or the artifices used to accomplish the result. 
Wilson V. Oldroyd, 1 U. (2d) 362, 267 P. 2d 759, 763. 
Most of the matters raised by the Defendant in it's 
motions (R. 111-113) and arguments in support of those 
motions (R. 254-270; 289-305) constitute a request that 
the Plaintiffs plead their evidence, which fact was admit-
ted by Defendant's counsel in open court (R. 305). If 
the Plaintiffs' pleadings have offended Rule 8 (a) it is 
probably by supplying Defendant with more detail con-
cerning the lawsuit than is required by Rule 8(a). 
(b) Demurrers. The order of dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
complaint is in effect an order sustaining a demurrer to 
that complaint. Rule 7 ( c), URCP reads as follows: 
"Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficience 
of a pleading shall not be used." 
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(c) Defendant's motions are not properly before the 
Court. Defendant has raised many matters in it's motion 
to dismiss that cannot properly be raised by motion and 
which can be asserted in a responsive answer to Plain-
trlfs' complaint. Rule 12 (b), URCP, which specifies how 
defenses and objections may be presented reads in part 
as follows: 
"Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief 
in any pleading .... shall be asserted in the respon-
sive pleading thereto if one is required, except the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader 
be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, ( 3) improper venue, ( 4) insufficiency of 
process, ( 5) insufficiency or service of process, 
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party 
... " (emphasis added) 
Rule 7 (a) specifies that the only "pleadings" allowed 
are complaints and answers or replies thereto, according-
ly any defenses except those listed as itms ( 1) through 
17) above must be asserted by Defendant in it's answer, 
not in the present motion to dismiss. Rule 12 (b) provides 
that the defenses specifically enumerated in sub-sections 
O)through (7) of Rule 12(b), whether raised by motion 
or by answer, can be heard at a preliminary hearing 
prior to the time of trial. Since the only one of the seven 
subdivisions listed in said Rule 12 (b) which is raised 
by Defendant is sub-section (6) pertaining to "failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," it 
clearly appears that the other matters raised in that 
motion such as res judicata, laches, statute of limitations, 
capacity to sue, etc. could not properly be raised by 
10 
motion and accordingly were and are not properly before 
the Court. 
Rule 8 ( c), URCP specifies the manner in which those 
defenses are to be asserted in a pleading in a law 1 SU!. 
That rule reads in part as follow: 
"In pleading_ to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively ... laches ... res judicata 
... statute of limitations ... and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense " 
(d) Plaintiffs' capacity to sue. One of the primarv 
arguments by Defendant is that the complaint fails t~ 
allege the standing or capacity of the Plaintiffs to main-
tain this action and to represent the class of persons 
named as Plaintiffs herein. Rule 9(a) (1), URCP con-
cerning capacity to sue reads as follows: 
"CAPACITY. It is not necessary to aver the capacity 
of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a 
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity 
or the legal existence of an organized association of 
persons that is made a party. When a party desires 
to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any 
party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued 
in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific 
negative averment, which shall include such sup-
porting particulars as are peculiarly within the 
pleaders knowledge, and on such issue the party 
relying on such capacity, authority, or legal exis-
tence, shall establish the same on the TRIAL. 
(Emphasis added) 
( e) Is this a proper class action? This action is brought 
by the named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves as in-
dividuals and as a class action on behalf of all persons 
similarly situated. Defendants challenge the right to 
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maintain this action as a class action at all. Rule 23 (a) (2) 
reads in part as follows: 
"If persons constituting a class are so numerous as 
to make it impracticable to bring them all before 
the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly 
insure the adequate representation of all may, on 
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of 
the right sought to be enforced for or against the 
class is 
(1) .... 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the ad-
judication of claims which do or may affect specific 
properly in the action; or 
(3) ... " 
Defendant concedes that the members of the class 
number tens of thousand of persons (R. 268), which 
group is obviously too large of a group for it to be 
practical to bring the members before the Court in-
dividually. The object of this litigation is the adjudication 
of the rights of all of the owners of undivided interest 
in and to the assets held in trust by the Defendant for the 
benefit of it's patrons (the class of Plaintiffs herein), a 
type of class action commonly referred to as a Hybrid 
class action, and the judgment concerning which is res 
judicata as to all members of the class only as to their 
rights in the res in question. Salt Lake City vs. Utah 
Lake Farmers Assn., 4 U (2d) 14, 286 P. 2d. 773, 780. 
(f) Is Defendant a proper party to complaifn con-
cerning the adequacy of Plaintiffs' representation of the 
clas:-;? Defendant will not be injured by the determination 
of the Court in this case, whether the action is maintained 
by a few plaintiffs with a limited number of attorneys 
ur whether a large number of plaintiffs join in the action 
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with a multitude of counsel. Defendant can assert a 
defense against the Plaintiffs herein that it could ny . assert 
wit? . a larger number of named Plaintiffs, and the 
dec1s10n of the Court as to the ownership of the assets 
held in trust by Defendant and the rights and priorities 
of each will be just as binding upon all persons who own 
as interest in those assets as if all members of that class 
were named individually as plaintiffs in this action. Salt 
Lake City vs. Utah Lake Farmers Assn., 4 U (2d) 14, 286 
P. 2d 773, 780. Defendant simply is not in a position to 
complain as to the adequacy of the representation bv 
Plaintiffs in this action. The question of the adequac~ 
of the representation is primarily a question as to the 
competncy of counsel. There is no magic in numbers. 
A similar class action has been upheld when brought 
by a small number of milk producers who each had an 
undivided interest in a fund created in connection with 
the marketing of milk, to enjoin improper diversion of 
that fund, notwithstanding the fact that the interest 
of the named plaintiffs in that fund was small. Stark 
v. Brannan, D.C.D.C., 1949, 82 F. Supp. 614. If any 
members of the class, sought to be represented by the 
named Plaintiffs herein, object to this proceeding they 
can move to intervene in the action and object to the 
adequacy of the representation by the named Plaintiffs. 
The Court could properly order that notice of this pro-
ceeding be given to all interested parties or by publication 
in a newspaper of general cerculation in the areas where 
the class of Plaintiffs named herein reside in order to 
give all opportunity to appear and object to this 
proceeding if they desire to do so. Until a member of the 
class sought to be represented objects to the sufficiency 
l 
I 
I 
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of Plaintiffs' representation of the class this question 
is not properly before the Court. 
Plaintiffs have alleged the ultimate facts that they 
will adequately represent the class and all other essential 
elements necessary to allege under Rule 23 (a) to sustain 
a class action (R. 88). This creates an issue of fact and 
of law which Defendants can only contest at the time 
of the trial and not by motion, if in fact the Defendant 
has any right whatever to contest Plaintiffs'. standing 
to sue. The only persons who have moved to intervene 
in this action are four persons who desire to be included 
as named parties plaintiff and who want to persue the 
same action against Defendant as is contained in the com-
plaint on file herein. (R. 139; 165-167; 174; 206) 
(g) Dismissal of individual action by named Plain-
tiffs. Even if the class portion of this action were subject 
to dismissal, this action was filed by the named Plaintiffs 
as "individuals" and also as a class action. The named 
Plaintiffs have clearly stated a valid cause of action in 
their individual capacities and that portion of the com-
plaint should not be dismissed. Montgomery Ward & Co. 
v. Langer, C.C.A. 8th, 1948, 168 F. 2d 182. 
(h) The order of dismiJssal is in effect a summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant. Rule 56 ( c), URCP, 
pertaining to summary judgment reads in part as follows: 
" ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." 
Courts are, and should be, reluctant to grant a summary 
14 
judgment because litigants are thereby prevented fr 
fully presenting their case to the Court. Brandt v S . om 
. . · pnng-
v11le Bankmg Co., 10 U. (2d) 350, 353 P. 2d 460. A 
Summary judgment must be supported by evidenc 
admissions and inferences which, when viewed int:' 
light most favorable to the loser, show that "there is n~ 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movina 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". Such 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that 
the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which 
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. Bullock 
v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U. (2d) 1, 354 P. 
2d 559, 561. A summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing which pre-
cludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to 
the losing party. Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers 
Co-op., 11 U. (2d) 353, 359 P. 2d 18. The last sentence 
of Rule 12 (b), URCP expressly provides that under 
certain cirumstances a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim for relief shall be treated as a motion for 
summary judgment. 
(i) Are interests of the named Plaintiffs adverse to 
those of other members of the class? Defendant claims 
that a new class exists for each year, for each department 
and each class of certificate issued by Defendant and that 
the interests of each of these classes are adverse to the 
interests of the other alleged classes. Only one class of 
persons exists, to-wit: the persons who are owners of 
an undivided interest in the mass of assets held in trust 
by Defendant for the bentfit of it's patrons. The det~r­
mination of the ownership of these assets will necessarily 
. 'll 
require reference to the source of the assets, which WI 
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include the earnings realized by Defendant for each year 
and the manner in which the Defendant allocated a 
portion of those earning each year by issuing "cert-
ificates" to patrons, however because of the failure of De-
fendant to issue "certificates" to evidence ownership of 
the portion of each years earnings which were retained 
by Defendant as "reserves" it is unlikely that the share 
of any patron will be decreased to an amount less than 
allocated to him each year by the issuance ·of "cert 
ificates." In any event, the proper allocation of "margins" 
and "reserves" are merely evidence to be used at the 
trial of this matter to ascertain the undivided share of 
the mass of assets owned by each patron and the priority 
of each. Plaintiff does not seek judgment against any 
patron who may have received more than his share of 
assets from the Defendant and accordingly the interest 
of any such patron, if any exist, is not adverse in this 
lawsuit to the interest of the named Plaintiffs herein. 
In any class action to adjudicate various claims to specific 
property each member of the class will be interested 
in obtaining the maximum share of the asset, and in that 
sense there always will be some adverse claims between 
the various claimants, however this is not the type of 
adverse interest which will prevent the members of 
that class from maintaining a class action. The purpose 
of the rule is to permit an orderly adjudication of the 
rights of numerous persons to a common fund and to 
prevent a multiplicity of suits. It would be manifestly 
impossible for each of the tens of thousands of persons 
constituting the class in this action to each come before 
the court with a separate lawsuit, and even if that did 
occur the results would probably be inconsistent with 
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each other and a fair distribution of the fund Would 
probably be impossible. 
(j) Is any claim of Plaintiffs' res judicata? Thi 
question is not properly before the Court as indicated b s 
the discussion under points ( c) and (b) above, and Judg~ 
Hanson indicated in his ruling that he was not im-
pressed with the orgument relating to res ajudicata, since 
the only party that this could possibly apply to would 
be the plaintiff, Ray Tanner. (R. 78) The Court ruled 
in the prior action between Mr. Tanner and the De-
fendant herein that the question of reallocation of "mar-
gins" was outside of the scope of the pleadings in that 
case and refused to admit any evidence concerning those 
matters. (R. 275) We concede that the issue of res 
judicata, if properly raised in the answer and proven at 
the time of the trial, may apply to the reasonableness of 
"reserves" several years ago when that case was tried, 
however Plaintiffs assert that the nature of operations 
by Defendant have substantially changed since that 
time to the extent that the Defendant has now dis-
continued a substantial part of it's operations and leased 
many of it's facilities. R. 252) What may have been 
reasonable "reserves" several years ago may now be 
wholly unreasonable in view of changed circumstances. 
In any event, the determination of the reasonableness 
of the "reserves" only goes to the question of the right 
of the parties to have those "reserves" distributed and has 
nothing to do with determination of the ownership of 
those "reserves," which is the primary question to be 
resolved in this lawsuit. 
(k) Did the Plaintiffs violate an order of the Court? 
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' complaint should be 
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dismissed in accordance with Rule 41(b), URCP, for 
dolation of an order of the court, (R. 112; R. 255) and 
cities an alleged minute entry concerning an order of 
Judge Hanson which does not appear in the record, but 
which is quoted by Defendant in it's motion to dismiss 
!R. 112). That minute entry contains no more than a 
suggestion and does not constitute an order within the 
meaning of Rule 41 (b). In any event most of the problems 
raised by Defendant in the motion for a more definite 
statement referred to in that minute entry (R. 14-19) 
were cured by deleting the other defendants named in the 
original complaint, and the balance of the problems have 
been cured by the second amended complaint and the 
allegations contained therein which define the times, 
events, persons and things in much more minute detail 
than is required under our present "ultimate facts" rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant holds a large mass of assets in trust for the 
benefit of its patrons. The Defendant has not complied 
with the requirements of it's By-laws and Articles of 
Incorporation, which require that the records be so 
maintained that the ownership of those assets can be 
readily determined from the Defendant's records. It is 
now necessary for the Court to determine that ownership 
and the rights and priorities of the respective owners. 
The named Plaintiffs, together with other persons who 
desire to join as named plaintiffs, are members of the 
class of persons who own the assets, to-wit: patrons of 
Defendant who have contributed toward the acquisition 
of the assets in question. As members of that group, Plain-
tiffs are proper parties to represent the owners of the 
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property held in trust by Defendant in this class acti on. 
Defendant is only the trustee of those assts and should 
welcome an opportunity to determine the portion of those 
assets owned by each person and the rights and priorities 
of each. The only logical manner to determine said rights, 
priorities and ownership is by a class action. 
Plaintiffs should be given their day in court by setting 
aside the order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint and 
ordering the Defendant to answer. If the Court is of the 
opinion that the complaint is defective in any manner 
an amendment should be permitted. In any event, the 
action was also filed by the named Plaintiffs as an in-
dividual action on their own behalf and no grounds have 
been alleged or proven which would support the Court 
in dismissing that complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ronald C. Barker and Clarence J. Frost 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
